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Abstract: The Great Recession has inspired renewed interest in analyzing the behaviour of the 
economy during recession episodes, and how these temporary events can shape the productive 
structure of the economy for long periods. Most of the existing literature focuses on recessions 
at the aggregate level. We provide evidence on the behavior of a large set of developed and 
emerging markets at the disaggregate level around recession dates. We analyze sectoral value 
added (VA), employment, productivity, concentration, and structural change, and whether 
patterns arise in a systematic way.  We unveil a set of regularities in the behaviour of these 
variables for both sets of countries and depending on the productivity level and the level of 
external financial dependence of industries. We distinguish financial from normal recessions, 
and look at the patterns of the above variables according to the productivity level and the level 
of external financial dependence of industries. This study leads to a rich set of results grouped in 
14 stylized facts. Most importantly, we found that recessions tend to be more industry specific 
events in emerging markets and economy-wide phenomena in developed economies. Moreover, 
the amplitude of the cycle for VA and productivity growth is larger for emerging markets. The 
opposite is generally true for employment growth. Also, industries with high dependence on 
external finance generally face higher contractions in VA growth the year of the recession, and 
those contractions are higher in the case of financial than in the case of normal recessions. 
Finally, concentration of both VA and employment is higher among emerging markets, and 
especially when looking at employment shares. 
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1. Introduction 
There is renewed interest in analyzing the behaviour of the economy during recession 
episodes, and how these temporary events can shape the productive structure of the economy 
having long-lasting impacts. This interest has gained importance with the recent 2008/09 
financial crisis and global recession. In this paper, we make a first step towards understanding 
the behaviour of economies around recession periods at a more disaggregate level by looking at 
industrial data for a set of 37 developed and emerging economies. Our study addresses several 
important questions. First, are recessions more industry-specific or economy-wide events in 
developed and emerging economies? Second, depending on the one hand on the productivity 
level and on the other hand, on the level of external financial dependence, how do main 
macroeconomic variables and sectoral shares evolve during a recession in developed as 
compared to emerging markets? Third, how would those same variables evolve in the case of 
financial versus any other shock
1
 related recessions? Fourth, do recession episodes lead to 
concentration/specialization of VA and employment shares? Finally, are country-level 
productivity changes driven by changes in the labour productivity growth within industries or 
by changes in the allocation of labour between industries? 
To address these questions, we carry out a purely descriptive analysis about the 
evolution of a set of variables around recession episodes. We analyse a total of 120 recessions, 
among which 29 are identified as financial episodes, for 28 industries for a set of 37 developed 
and emerging economies. For each country, recessions are identified as observations where 
GDP displays negative growth. This enables us to detect which industries are facing a drop in 
VA growth in recession years and to analyse whether recession episodes tend to be more 
concentrated on a few industries or they are economy-wide events. We then focus on the 
evolution of Value Added (VA), employment, productivity, industrial concentration and 
sectoral shares, and distinguish for both emerging and developed economies between sectors 
depending on either their productivity level or their level of external financial dependence. The 
same analysis is performed when distinguishing between normal and financial recessions. 
Moreover, we make use of the Gini and HHI indexes to examine whether recessions are 
associated with any significant changes in the degree of concentration of VA and employment. 
Following Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), we can interpret concentration as „specialization‟, that is, 
whether a significant proportion of output (inputs) in the economy is being produced (used) by a 
few industries. Finally, we make use of a shift-share analysis to identify whether changes in 
productivity growth are linked to differential growth of labour productivity or to the reallocation 
of labour between industries. Although it is not possible to extract meaningful causal or 
structural interpretations from our results, they provide a set of stylized facts that are useful for 
both policy and model building. 
This allows us to provide an empirical investigation of the behaviour of an economy at a 
disaggregate level during recession episodes. Firstly, to our knowledge, no study has been made 
so far to characterize the disaggregate performance of economies around recessions. Lien 
(2006) characterizes research on the effects of recessions at an industrial or sectoral level a 
„byproduct‟. Secondly, as we will see later on, there is a wide body of theoretical literature on 
the reallocation effects of recessions (i.e., Hall, 1991, and Caballero and Hammour, 1994). 
There is also a body of empirical literature analysing the permanent effects of recessions, both 
normal and financial (i.e., Cerra and Saxena, 2008 and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a, 2009a). The 
former focuses on individual country experiences and is limited by data availability. This makes 
it difficult to analyse whether recessions have systematic effects that differ according to the 
level of firstly, economic development, secondly, industrial productivity, and thirdly, industrial 
external financial dependence. The latter focuses on aggregate time-series evidence, and aims at 
unveiling whether recovery after a recession is complete or partial. This evidence, although very 
relevant, cannot dissect what lies behind these potential permanent effects: reallocation of 
factors of production, within sector productivity effects, permanent changes in the level of 
                                                          
1 We will be calling recessions that do not arise from financial shocks, „normal‟ episodes. 
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sectoral investment and employment, etc. This study aims to fill this gap by analysing the 
effects of recessions on structural change and the sources of productivity growth by focusing on 
a large industry-level dataset for a large set of countries. Thirdly, our descriptive analysis 
enables us to report the characteristics of business cycle across industries in recession years. 
This examination is important for understanding the sources for business cycles.  Many 
researchers have analysed the role of sector-specific factors in shaping business cycles in a 
closed economy setting. For instance, Long and Plosser (1987) use factor analysis to estimate 
the importance of disaggregate shocks in the US. Their results show that although disaggregated 
shocks are important, aggregate ones remain the most important source in explaining industrial 
output fluctuations. Similar results were shown by Norrbin and Schlagenhauf (1988, 1990) and 
Pesaran et al. (1993). This could also then have important effects on the coordination of 
international business cycles. Imbs (2004) argues that, given that individual industries are 
subject to common shocks, two countries with similar production structure will be subject to 
greater co-movement
2
. Clearly, understanding how economies respond to recessions at a 
disaggregate level is crucial for both policies and model-building. Finally, the literature has 
treated separately the analysis of business cycles in advanced and in emerging economies. In 
this study we compare the experience of both sets of countries. This comparison is particularly 
relevant as market institutions significantly differ across advanced and emerging economies, 
especially with respect to the development of financial markets. The development of financial 
markets is crucial both for the transmission of shocks to the economy and for the capability of 
an economy to support an efficient reallocation of resources across sectors.  
This study led to a rich set of results grouped in 14 stylized facts. Here, we report the 
most important findings of this paper. Recessions tend to be more industry specific events in 
emerging markets and economy-wide phenomena in developed countries. While emerging 
markets display more dispersion in VA growth rates and hence more industry-specific 
recessions, this dispersion behaves counter-cyclically for developed countries and pro-cyclically 
for emerging markets. Moreover, whether industries are grouped in terms of their productivity 
level or their level of external financial dependence, the amplitude of the cycle for VA and 
productivity growth is larger for emerging markets. The opposite is generally true for 
employment growth. Also, overall, recovery in developed countries is mostly productivity 
driven, independently of the level of industrial productivity, while for emerging markets 
recovery is mostly employment driven. Importantly, in developed countries there seems to be a 
redistribution of VA and employment shares from the lowest productivity group to the rest of 
the industries. This only holds for employment shares in the emerging countries. Likewise, 
when looking at the level of external financial dependence, industries with high dependence on 
external finance generally face higher contractions in VA growth the year of the recession, and 
those contractions are higher in the case of financial than in the case of normal recessions. Also, 
industries with high dependence generally face a higher output growth after a recession than the 
industries with low dependence. Moreover, after a recession episode, VA shares are 
redistributed from the industries that have Low or No external financial dependence towards the 
other groups with higher dependence. This pattern holds for both the developed and the 
emerging countries. For employment shares the same pattern is observed but only for the 
developed economies. 
Furthermore, the analysis comparing normal and financial recessions shows that when 
the latter occur, industries face larger contractions in VA growth, independently of whether 
industries are grouped in terms of productivity level or external financial dependence. Also, VA 
and productivity growth follows a W shaped pattern for both methodologies of grouping 
                                                          
2 A minority of researchers have expanded this analysis to an international setting. Norrbin and Schlagenhauf (1996) 
show that although the industry-specific shock explains a small part of the variance of the forecast error, nation-
specific shocks are more important in explaining variations in output. Recently, Karadimitropoulou and León-
Ledesma (2012) highlighted the importance of understanding international output fluctuations from a multi-sector 
perspective. Their research showed that sectors play an important role in the transmission of international output 
fluctuations. 
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industries. That is, although one year after the recession growth has recovered to pre-recession 
levels, most of the industries face a larger contraction two years following the episode. 
Additionally, while in the occurrence of normal recessions there seems to be a redistribution of 
VA shares from the most productive to the less productive groups, in the case of financial crises 
the opposite is observed. However, employment shares are generally redistributed from the less 
productive group(s) to the most productive ones for both normal and financial recessions. 
We also find that changes in industrial concentration around recessions are small for 
both groups of countries, but in general they lead to slightly higher concentration, especially for 
emerging countries. Finally, country-level productivity changes are mainly driven by changes in 
the labour productivity growth within industries, as the within-shift effect is positive for the 
majority of the countries considered. 
Traditional business cycle literature models assume that cycles and growth are 
independent. However, there is a wide body of theoretical literature suggesting several 
mechanisms linking recessions and productivity growth.
3
 Essentially, there are two broad 
groups characterising this literature. The first emphasizes the positive impact of cycle booms, 
due to productive activities or technical progress, on productivity growth. The second 
emphasizes the positive impact that recessions have on productivity. The first group is 
represented by the learning-by-doing model of Stadler (1990) and the R&D models of Aghion et 
al. (2005) and Barlevy (2007), pointing towards pro-cyclical productivity effects due to 
endogenous innovations.
4
 The second group is represented by the Shumpeterian models of 
Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Hall (1991), which emphasize how recessions can 
eliminate unproductive firms under certain stringent conditions. In particular, the former study 
argues that recessions can have a “cleansing effect” on the economy by eliminating industries 
that have inefficient and unproductive units, leading to an increased average productivity. The 
latter research emphasizes on the opportunity cost view, which recognises that recession periods 
usually lead to reallocation of activities within firms, and argues that, given that the cost of 
eliminating production and asset values is lower, then the opportunity cost of restructuring will 
also be lower. However, if the entry of new firms in the market is slower during recessions, then 
the „insulating effect‟ could substantially reduce the cleansing effect.5,6 
A large number of empirical studies have also examined the effects of recessions on the 
productive structure of the economy, with special focus on whether those temporary events can 
have long-lasting impacts. For instance, Gali and Hammour (1993) show that, in the US, 
productivity growth in the medium- to long-run increases after a recession episode. In contrast, 
Caballero and Hammour (2005) suggest that the cumulative amount of restructuring in the 
manufacturing sector of the US falls when recessions occur.  Cerra and Saxena (2008) study the 
aggregate effect of recessions and find that, far from being temporary phenomena, they can lead 
to permanent output losses. This conclusion appears to be supported by the experience of 
African countries according to Arbache and Page (2007 and 2010). Recently, Christopoulos and 
León-Ledesma (2009), also study the impact of recessions on frontier productivity and technical 
inefficiency. They find that the average cumulative impact of recessions on productivity up to 
four years after its end is negative and significant. There is also a large body of evidence on 
volatility and growth, as reviewed by Loayza et al. (2007), focusing on the impact of amplitude 
and duration of cycles on growth. 
                                                          
3 For a survey on this literature, see Saint-Paul (1997). 
4 Malley and Muscatelli (1999) investigate the relationship between business cycles and productivity growth in US 
manufacturing.  Using an exactly identified VAR model, they show that recessions can lead to total factor 
productivity growth through reorganization and restructuring effects. However, empirical evidence at the micro level, 
especially for the US, usually focuses on job flows data, as in Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992, 1995) and in 
Davis et al. (1996). 
5 For more details on those two effects, see Caballero and Hammour (1994). 
6 As Barlevy (2002) explains, these effects do not highlight that recessions lead to welfare gains. For instance, a fall 
in aggregate productivity, which makes agents worse off, may also lead to the elimination of the less efficient 
productivity firms.  
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Moreover, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a, 2009a) and Claessens et al. (2008) focus on 
how financial variables and asset prices interact with output contractions. They show that 
financial distress can lead to highly persistent (sometimes permanent) and deep recessions. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Eichengreen and Rose (1998) found similar results, that is, 
banking crises lead to a deceleration of aggregate output. Ceccheti et al. (2009) demonstrate that 
banking episodes coincide with large output contractions and recovery does take several years. 
In essence, those events seem to lead to long-lasting negative output effects. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008b) use historical data financial crises dating from the mid-fourteenth century 
default of England to the current subprime crisis in the US. Their study reveals a number of 
important facts. Episodes of serial default and high inflation are nearly universal and they are 
often associated with shocks to commodity prices, capital flows, interest rates and investors‟ 
confidence. Some years or decades separate major defaults and this pattern has given rise to the 
“this time is different” syndrome. This syndrome has been expanding as not only countries but 
also creditors and policymakers believe to have learned from previous mistakes and 
consequently, a default is unlikely to be faced.  
Furthermore, a large body of literature focuses on the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth.
7
 In essence, industries differ in their dependence on 
external finance. During recession period, the ability to acquire external finance is restricted. 
The literature distinguishes two main reasons for this effect, namely the balance sheet channel 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989 and 1990) and the bank lending channel (Bernanke and Blinder, 
1998). In 1998, Rajan and Zingales identify the level of an industry‟s dependence on external 
finance (the difference between investments and cash generated by operations) from data on US 
firms. By assuming that capital markets in the US are relatively frictionless, this method allows 
them to identify an industry‟s technological demand for external financing. Then, by also 
assuming that such technological demands are carried over to other countries, they can use an 
industry‟s dependence on external finance as identified in the US as a measure of its 
dependence in other countries. The index provided measures an industry‟s external financial 
dependence in the 1980‟s. Their results show that industries that are more dependent on external 
finance grow faster in countries, where financial markets are more developed. Braun and 
Larrain (2005), using productivity growth for a large number of manufacturing industries for 
over 100 countries and a sample period of approximately 40 years, show that recessions hit 
harder industries that are more dependent on external finance. This effect is even more 
pronounced in countries with poor financial contractibility. Similarly, Kroszner et al. (2007) 
find that, during banking crises, sectors relying heavily on external finance will experience 
greater VA contractions in countries with deeper than in the ones with shallower financial 
systems.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 
describes recession episodes at the aggregate and sectoral level. Section 4 discusses the 
methodology used for the descriptive analysis. Section 5 presents the results and, finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Data description 
We make use of the UNIDO Industrial statistics database (INDSTAT). The INDSTAT, 
in accordance with Revision 2 of the International Standard Industrial Classification of All 
Economic Activities (ISIC), presents the dataset arranged at the 3-digit level of the ISIC code, 
which provides 28 industrial branches of the manufacturing sector (plus the total manufacturing 
aggregate). Appendix A lists the manufacturing industries with their associated ISIC codes. The 
fact that the dataset only covers the manufacturing sector is also its main disadvantage. It may 
have been possible to overcome this problem by making use of the EU KLEMS database,
8
 
which provides measures of output, value added, employment by skills, capital, energy and 
                                                          
7 See Levine (1997, 2005) for a survey on this literature.  
8 See O‟Mahony and Timmer (2009) and the web link at: http://www.euklems.net/  
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material inputs, and multi-factor productivity at the sectoral level for the European Union, the 
US, South Korea and Japan. However, the main disadvantage of this database is that it limits the 
sample coverage only to developed countries. Given our interest in performing a comparison 
between developed and emerging countries and covering a wide set of economies by income 
level and volatility, the UNIDO dataset is more suitable for this study.
9
 It is also likely that input 
and output data in services sectors is also subject to greater measurement error. Moreover, we 
focus on a sector that is generally considered vital for a country‟s development process. 
We also collected data for annual GDP growth from the World Bank WDI database in 
order to identify the recession years. The business cycle dating literature normally uses quarterly 
indicators as in the NBER definition of recessions, but quarterly data are not available for the 
majority of countries selected. Recessions are then identified as observations where GDP 
displays negative growth. We consider not only a definition of “deep recession” when the GDP 
percentage drop is larger than the mean drop of output in all the recessions faced by the other 
countries in the sample, but also a definition of deep recessions where the mean output drop for 
comparison is split depending on the country group (developed and emerging). This is because 
GDP growth tends to be more volatile in emerging economies. By comparing them to all 
countries, we would be considering too many deep recessions, especially because developed 
countries are over-represented due to data availability.
10
 
The UNIDO dataset spans the 1963-2003 period. However, data availability for the 
1963-1969 period and for 2003 is very limited, so we effectively limited the study to the 1970-
2002 period. The sample selection of countries and periods from the UNIDO dataset was based 
on data availability. We used three criteria for the inclusion of countries. Firstly, we require at 
least 18 years of observations (half of the available sample) to ensure data was not available 
only for specific periods, especially when the country reaches a certain level of development. 
Secondly, we require data availability for at least 13 industrial branches of the manufacturing 
sector (roughly half the number of branches). Finally, every country in the sample must have 
experienced at least one recession according to the definition above. Based on those criteria, a 
total 37 countries were selected for the analysis, including 22 developed and 15 emerging 
economies. Because of discontinuities and gaps in the data, missing values of up to three years 
in the observations were recovered by data interpolation. Clearly, the number of sectors remains 
constant in each country over time; however, it does vary across countries.  
VA data are given in nominal terms and UNIDO does not provide sectoral VA 
deflators. It does, however, contain industrial production data, which are in “volume” index 
number, as well as nominal output data for all countries. Using these data we then obtained 
production deflators for each branch and country. West Germany was the only country for 
which the “volume” index was not available and, therefore, we made use of the EU KLEMS 
dataset which provides the VA Manufacturing deflator at a disaggregated level from 1970 to 
1991. VA was then deflated to obtain real VA (RVA) in the standard way: 
ijt
ijt
ijt
VA
RVA
PY
= , 
where PY is the output deflator, j is a country index, i is an industry branch index, and t is the 
time index. This also enables us to construct the real labour productivity level as the level of 
RVA in local currency per worker (L): 
ijt
ijt
ijt
RVA
LP
L
= . Data on capital stock is not available, 
and because investment data is very sparse and available only for a few countries, we cannot 
build measures of capital stock using standard inventories methods. Hence, although arguably a 
less satisfactory measure of productivity than TFP, labour productivity ensures less 
                                                          
9 Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) report that measures such as industrial concentration and specialization for UNIDO tend 
to display less variation than databases containing other sectors such as agriculture, mining and services. However, 
this pattern is exclusive to rich countries. 
10 Deep recessions are only used for the analysis of the incidence, duration and amplitude of recessions at the 
aggregate level. 
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measurement error. Also, LP will reflect productivity effects coming from both supply and 
demand shocks. 
3. Recessions: some descriptive analysis 
3.1. Incidence, Duration and Amplitude of recessions 
From 1970 to 2002, we observe 120 recessions for the 37 country sample as reported in 
Table 1. The Table reports the sample period for each country (column 2), the cumulative sum 
of the drop in GDP(column 3) and the mean GDP drop (column 4) during all recessions faced 
by each country, and column 5, 6, and 7  display the number of recessions, their average 
duration, and the number of deep recessions, respectively. 71 of those recessions took place 
within the developed group of countries and the remaining 49 were faced by the emerging 
markets, implying a similar number of recessions per country for both groups. However, sample 
periods are generally shorter for emerging markets, which implies a slightly higher incidence of 
recessions for that group. Iran underwent the largest number of recessions, 11, between 1970 
and 2002 and this clearly places it first in the sum drop of output list. Indonesia experienced the 
largest average fall in GDP during recessions, but it only experienced one recession in 1997. 
Other countries like the UK and the US faced five recessions each during the time period 
considered with the impact on GDP growth being larger for the UK than for the US. Overall, we 
can see that the severity of recessions in emerging markets exceeds that of developed countries, 
which is a common feature analyzed in, for instance, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). This happens 
not because of a higher incidence of recessions, but because, primarily, recessions in the 
emerging world are deeper. We can also see this by looking into the incidence of deep 
recessions. 32 out of the 120 recessions were classed as “deep” when considering all countries; 
6 of them took place in developed countries and the remaining 26 in the emerging markets. In 
other words, out of the 120 recessions, 32 produced a higher drop in output than the mean drop 
of output faced by all countries (2.73%). When using developed and emerging country averages 
as reference groups, we see that for developed countries 29 out of 71 recessions were considered 
deep, whereas 20 out of 49 recessions are deep for emerging economies.  
The average duration of recessions is very close for both groups of countries, only 
slightly shorter for the developed group. On average recessions last about one year and four 
months. However, it is likely that this figure is inflated because we only have annual data, 
setting a floor of one year to the minimum recession duration. Finland is the country facing the 
largest average duration due to the deep and long-lasting depression during the early 1990s. On 
average, also, recessions tend to happen every 9 years, although this number is slightly lower for 
emerging countries.  
3.2. Industry Specific versus Economic Wide Recessions 
An interesting feature to analyze in the data is whether recession episodes tend to be 
more concentrated on a few industries or they are economy-wide events. Note that, given that 
we identify recessions using GDP and our UNIDO data only contains manufacturing, this may 
tend to underestimate the incidence of recessions with a sector-specific bias. Nevertheless, 
comparisons between countries are still possible. Using our definition of recessions, we identify 
which industries are facing a drop in VA growth in recession years. This enables us to show the 
average percentage of industries in recession during the episode, and hence to classify 
recessions according to the percentage of industries in recession. That is, whether there are co-
ordinated business cycles across industries in recession years.  
Another metric to report the degree of business cycle coordination across industries is 
the standard deviation of the growth rate of VA across industries within a country. If recessions 
predominantly affect a few industries with little spillover effects over others, we would expect 
to see an increase in the dispersion of growth rates at recession episodes.  
Table 2 shows the average percentage of industries facing a negative VA growth during 
recession years (t = REC) for each country and group. It also shows the percentage of recessions 
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for each country where different percentages of industry branches showed negative VA growth. 
This enables us to identify whether countries face predominantly industry-specific or economy-
wide recessions. We can see that the average percentage of contracting industries at the time of 
recession episodes is slightly higher for developed than emerging countries, 67.43% and 
63.98% respectively. While Canada and West Germany display the highest percentage of 
contracting industries at the time of the episode (85.89% and 81.48% respectively) Ireland 
displays the lowest percentage out of all the countries (35.19%). From the emerging countries 
group, we can see that in Colombia, Honk Kong, and Indonesia, 88.71%, 84.62% and 86.36% 
of industries, respectively, are contracting at t = REC. Malta, India and Jordan represent the 
other extreme in this group.  
Perhaps more informative, in the second part of the table from which we can see that, in 
developed countries, 47.14% of the recessions were associated with VA contraction for 70% or 
more industries, 21.43% with between 60 and 70%, 12.86% with between 50 and 60% of the 
industries and, finally, only 18.571% with less than 50% contracting industries. In contrast, the 
numbers for emerging markets are consistently lower for high percentages of industries. In fact, 
almost 37% of recessions were accompanied by less that 50% of industrial branches contracting, 
with 16.327% of them being characterised by a contraction in less than 30% of the industrial 
branches. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the low export diversification of these countries and 
their sensitivity to terms of trade shocks, we can conclude that emerging market recession tend 
to be more industry-specific as compared to developed countries, where co-ordination appears 
to be stronger.  
Table 3 reports the average standard deviation of industrial VA growth for each country 
for the 7 years spanning before, during, and after a recession (that is, for t -3, t-2,..., t, t+1,..., 
t+3, with t being the recession year)
11
. Looking at the group averages at the bottom of the table, 
we can see that, consistent with the results in Table 2, the dispersion of industrial growth rates 
for emerging markets is always higher than for developed economies and of an order of 
magnitude of almost twice. Figure 1 shows the average standard deviation of the VA growth 
rates together with the upper and lower quartile for each group of countries. This figure and 
Table 2 show the behaviour of this metric around recession points. We can observe that, while 
the standard deviation for developed countries increases during recessions (and the year 
before),
12
 for emerging markets the dispersion of growth rates actually increases during the 
recovery period. During recessions and the two preceding years, the dispersion of VA growth 
rates is actually smaller than for the rest of the years.  
These results point to a marked difference between the behaviour of sectors across the 
two groups of countries: while emerging markets display more dispersion in VA growth rates 
and hence more industry-specific recessions, this dispersion behaves counter-cyclically for 
developed countries and pro-cyclically for emerging markets. 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Sectoral activity and shares 
Good part of our descriptive analysis will focus on how economic activity at a sectoral 
level behaves around recessions episodes. We are particularly interested on the evolution of VA, 
employment, productivity, and VA and employment shares as indicators of sectoral reallocation. 
Given the definition of a recession discussed above, we plot the evolution of these variables for 
the 7 years that span the 3 pre-recession and the 3 post-recession years (REC-3 to REC+3).
13
 
The plots contain the average behaviour of the variable across all recessions for each country. 
We analyzed the results for each country and industry. However, to facilitate presentation, we 
only report averages for the two groups of developed and emerging countries.  
                                                          
11 More on this in the next section. 
12 Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) report a similar result that the dispersion of capital productivity among firms and of 
sectoral TFP are both countercyclical. 
13 Much like a standard “Burns-Mitchell” diagram. 
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Furthermore, because presentation and interpretation is obscured by the large number of 
industries and variables available, we also collapse industries in four groups depending on their 
(labour) productivity level. This is because a question of interest, rather than the specific 
branches themselves, is whether activity relocates between branches with different productivity 
characteristics. We classify industries into the following 4 categories: High, Medium-High, 
Medium-Low, and Low productivity. We used 2 different methodologies for this classification. 
The first simply ranks industries for each country (within) in terms of their productivity levels 
and assigns them into their corresponding groups by quartiles. The second methodology, rather 
than using a within country criterion, ranks industries by their level of productivity relative to 
the same industry in the US. That is, this classification normalizes by the standard dispersion in 
productivity that exists across different industries because of technical characteristics using the 
US as the reference country. Although there are some non-negligible differences between these 
two classification methods regarding the composition of branches, both gave similar results in 
terms of their behaviour around recession points. For this reason, we report here only the results 
using the first method.
14
 Also, this classification is perhaps more interesting as it ranks 
industries according to their within country productivity level and is hence compatible with a 
definition of comparative advantage.
15
 All variables were then averaged out for the industries in 
each group for both groups of developed and emerging countries.
16
  
Moreover, Rajan and Zingales (1998) identify the level of an industry‟s dependence on 
external finance (the difference between investments and cash generated by operations) from 
data on US firms
17
. We make use of this index and collapse industries in four groups depending 
on the level of external financial dependence: Low to No external financial dependence, 
Medium-Low, Medium-High, and High external financial dependence. Given that their index 
provides a measure of an industry‟s external financial dependence in the 1980‟s, we assume that 
the same ordering will hold for the specific time period under examination in this study, 1970-
2002. Importantly, we want to observe whether the depth of the recession and the speed of 
recovery alter for different levels of financial dependency, and whether this result is different 
between developed and developing countries.
18
 All variables were then averaged out for the 
industries in each group for both groups of developed and emerging countries. 
Finally, we distinguish between normal and financial recessions by externally 
identifying banking crises using Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a). Also, we compare financial 
episodes in developed and emerging economies. From the 120 recessions analysed in this study, 
29 were identified as financial recessions, among which 19 took place in the developed 
economies and the remaining 10 occurred in the emerging markets. Appendix B shows the 
countries and years for which financial recessions took place. We then carry on the same 
analysis as above and compare the results on the one hand, with normal, i.e. non-financial, 
recessions and on the other hand, of developed and emerging countries.
19
 
 
                                                          
14 The results from the second method are available on request. 
15 The classification of the industries included in each group of productivity for all countries is available upon 
request. 
16 Results were also obtained by arranging the recession plots by industry, but are not reported here for space reasons. 
17 In particular, assuming that capital markets in the US are relatively frictionless, this method allows them to identify 
an industry‟s technological demand for external financing. Then, by also assuming that such technological demands 
are carried over to other countries, they can use an industry‟s dependence on external finance as identified in the US 
as a measure of its dependence in other countries. The index provided measures an industry‟s external financial 
dependence in the 1980‟s. 
18 The classification of the industries included in each group of external financial dependence is available upon 
request. 
19 We also derive the evolution of all the variables for each industry in the case of normal versus financial recessions 
when averaging across all countries, together with the evolution of all variables for each industry for developed and 
emerging economies around financial episodes. Results are available upon request. 
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4.2. Gini and HHI Indexes 
We also examined whether recessions are associated with any significant changes in the 
degree of concentration of VA and employment. We can interpret this concentration as 
“specialisation” as in Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), that is, whether a significant proportion of 
output (inputs) in the economy is being produced (used) by a few industries. By looking at VA 
and employment concentration, we can also infer the dispersion of productivity across 
industries. Whether recessions are associated with greater or lower specialisation, of course, will 
depend on institutions, availability of credit, labour market frictions, changes in the composition 
of demand, openness, etc. We make use of two different measures: the Gini coefficient and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
The Gini coefficient uses information on how VA and Employment shares are 
distributed across the different industries. Employment shares have commonly been used in the 
empirical literature concerning sectoral specialization as a measure of sector size. However, 
making use of sectoral VA shares helps generalizing the evidence based on sectoral labor 
inputs.  
A simple expression for the Gini index is based on the covariance between the ranked 
shares of VA or employment by industry, SR, and rank that the industry occupies in the 
distribution of VA/Employment share, F. This rank takes a value between zero for the lowest 
VA/Employment share and one for the highest. The Gini index, varying between 0 for lowest 
and 1 for highest inequality, is then defined as this covariance is multiplied by 2 and divided 
through by the average VA/Employment share RS : 
2 ( , )
Gini R
R
Cov S F
S
          (2) 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is another indicator of the level of 
concentration/specialization among industries in a sector used in the industrial organisation 
literature. It is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of each industry branch in the 
sector. Again, we made use of both VA shares and employment shares to obtain the HHI. A 
decrease in the HHI indicates a decrease in concentration (a more diversified sector). The 
expression for HHI is then: 
2
1
,
N
i
i
H S

           (3) 
where Si is the share (of VA or employment) of branch i in the manufacturing sector, and N is 
the number of branches. The HHI (H) ranges from 1/N to one. If all branches have an equal 
share, the reciprocal of the index shows the number of industries in the sector. The HHI takes 
into account the relative size and distribution of the industries in a sector and approaches zero 
when a sector consists of a large number of industries of relatively equal size. The HHI 
increases both as the number of industries in the market decreases and as the disparity in size 
between those industries increases. Because of this dependence on N, and given that countries in 
our sample have unequal numbers of branches, we prefer to use the normalized Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index:
  
 1/
* .
1 1/
H N
H
N



          (4) 
While the H ranges from 1/N to 1, H* ranges from 0 to 1 regardless of the number of branches 
considered. 
  
4.3. Accounting for Structural Change: a Shift-Share Analysis 
Shift-share analysis is a descriptive technique to analyze the sources of productivity 
growth. First proposed by Maddison (1952), it shows how aggregate growth is mechanically 
linked to differential growth of labour productivity and the reallocation of labour between 
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industries. It has been widely applied for analysing the effect of industrial structural change on 
productivity growth (e.g. Fagerberg, 2000 and Peneder 2003) and microeconomic evidence on 
the sources of growth (e.g. Foster et al, 2001).  
Let us define LP = Labour Productivity, VA = Value Added, L = Labour input, and i = 
industry index with i = (1,…,N). Then, 



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








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LP .        (5) 
Define 


i
i
i
i
L
L
S  as the share of industry i in total employment. Then we have that: 
 
i
ii SLPLP .          (6) 
Defining
1 0 1
,
o
LP LP LP S S SD = - D = -  and using equation (6), we have: 
  
i
iiiiii DSDLPDLPSDSLPDLP 00       (7) 
We can express (7) in growth rate form: 
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     (8) 
The percentage change in labour productivity between time t = 0 and t = 1 is hence decomposed 
into three distinct effects. The first component of eq. (8) is the so-called „between-shift effect‟ 
and it measures the impact that changes in the allocation of labour between industries have on 
productivity growth. It will be positive if the share of high productivity industries increases in 
total employment by attracting more labour resources at the expense of low productivity 
industries. In other words, this term will reflect the ability of a country to reallocate labour 
resources from low to high productive industries. 
The second term in (8) is the so-called „within-shift effect‟ and it measures the change 
in productivity that would have prevailed if no change in sectoral shares had taken place 
between 0 and 1. That is, it measures only productivity gains that have occurred only within 
industries. Hence, this effect identifies the contribution from labour productivity growth 
weighted by employment shares at time 0.  
Finally, the third effect is the so-called „dynamic-shift effect‟. It captures interactions 
between changes in sectoral structure and within productivity effects. This effect will be 
positive if changes in shares favour those industries where productivity is growing. Thus, the 
„dynamic-shift effect‟ reflects whether a country reallocates its labour resources towards the fast 
growing productivity industries.
20
 
5. Results 
5.1. Sectoral activity and shares 
As mentioned above, we present here graphical evidence on the behaviour of several 
variables of interest around recession dates. The results are presented grouping industries firstly, 
by levels of productivity, and secondly, by levels of external financing dependence. Using these 
two groupings, on the one hand, we distinguish between developed and emerging economies, 
                                                          
20 These effects are also commonly associated to Baumol et al. (1985) asymptotic stagnancy theory, which views 
productivity growth as the result of changes in sectoral structure at different stages of development.  
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and on the other hand, between normal and financial recessions. We show evidence on the 
evolution of VA growth, employment growth, productivity growth, productivity level, and VA 
and employment shares from three years before (REC-3) to three years after (REC+3) the 
recession (REC). 
5.1.1. Developed versus Emerging economies 
(i) By levels of productivity for each group of countries 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of averaged VA growth from REC-3 to REC+3 for 
developed and emerging countries. Both groups of countries display a V shaped pattern at the 
REC point. The amplitude of the cycle is larger for emerging markets for all groups of 
productivity levels. Note that, at t=REC, the lower the productivity level of an industry in 
developed countries the higher the contraction it will face. When comparing REC-3 to REC+3 
values, we can see that neither emerging nor developed economies recover to pre-recession rates 
within the 3 years following the recession. Despite that fact, some notable differences exist. 
Emerging markets generally face larger contractions than the developed countries, except for 
the medium-high productivity level group. Moreover, while the two highly productive groups of 
industries face the largest drops in VA growth in developed countries, in the emerging 
economies it is the two lowest productive groups that seem to be affected the most by recession 
episodes in terms of recovery. In particular, for the developed countries the medium-high 
productivity group displays the largest contraction (≈2.5%) and for the emerging economies, it 
is the medium-low productivity group (≈3.6%).  
Similarly, Figure 3 displays the evolution of averaged employment growth from REC-3 
to REC+3 for developed and emerging countries. Both groups of countries display a V shaped 
pattern around the recession time period, although the amplitude of the cycle is larger for 
developed countries. Moreover, the recovery in employment is much stronger for emerging than 
for developed economies, suggesting a higher degree of real wage flexibility in emerging 
economies.
21
 For the majority of the groups, the deepest contraction is observed the year of the 
recession. However, notable exceptions exist. For the developed countries, the high and low 
productivity groups are lagging the recession by one year, while for the emerging economies the 
medium-high productivity group is leading the recession by one year. Moreover, on the one 
hand, the high productivity group of the emerging markets does not face negative growth 
throughout the 7 years of analysis and on the other hand, the low productivity group of the 
developed countries displays negative growth from REC-3 to REC+3. Importantly, when 
comparing pre- to post-recession values, this figure shows that on average, the majority of 
manufacturing sectors in developed countries face very persistent employment losses after a 
recession. The opposite is true for the emerging markets, as for any given productivity level, 
industries do on average recover to higher growth rates after the recession episode. 
Interestingly, while the two lowest productive groups of the emerging markets face the highest 
contractions in VA growth, they face the largest expansions in employment growth, although 
the latter are bigger than the former. This is also reflected by Figure 4, which displays the 
evolution of productivity growth. This graph reflects a combination of the VA and employment 
growth figures.  
Overall, recovery in developed countries is mostly productivity driven, as the majority 
of the groups face long-lasting employment losses. In contrast, for emerging markets recovery is 
mostly employment driven, as all categories of productivity level face long-lasting employment 
gains together with long-lasting productivity losses. Moreover, we can see that productivity 
level catches-up immediately with pre-recession levels, except for the highly productive 
industries of the emerging countries, which do not reach pre-recession levels within the 3 years 
following the recession (Figure 5). Of course, the level is also driven by the trend, so it‟s not 
                                                          
21 Agenor and Montiel (2008) stress in their textbook, on macroeconomics in developing countries, that emerging 
economies display higher real wage flexibility than developed economies. 
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possible to conclude that recessions do not have permanent effects unless we have a definition 
of the trend (i.e. what would productivity be with no recession). 
Moreover, the evolution of averaged VA share per level of productivity is shown by 
Figure 6. Shares in general do not display very marked variation around the recession date. 
Some underlying trends appear to be dominating, especially for the developed countries. But, in 
general, in developed countries there seems to be a redistribution of VA shares from the lowest 
productivity group to the three remaining groups, albeit very small. The emerging economies 
are not characterized by any restructuring in VA shares after a recession episode, as all 
industries seem to have faced small gains in shares. Those results must be driven by particular 
countries facing higher than average gains in output shares. For instance, for the medium-low 
productivity group, Hungary and Indonesia display significant increases in output shares, while 
the majority of the remaining countries face slight falls in their VA shares. Similarly, in the low 
productive group it is Honk-Kong and Jordan that drive the average VA shares to increase, as 
their shares increased from ≈11.5% to ≈12.5% and from ≈7.4% to ≈8.6%, respectively.22 
Despite that we can see that the larger gains in output shares are faced by the lowest productive 
group of industries. 
Moreover, employment share‟s evolution also shows that trend dominates the cyclical 
pattern for both developed and emerging economies (Figure 7). Overall, both developed and 
emerging countries, we can say that there is a redistribution of employment shares from the less 
productive group to the remaining industries. While the medium-high productive group gains 
most shares after a recession episode in developed countries, in the emerging markets it is the 
medium-low productive group facing the highest gain.  
Finally, there is clear relationship between industrial productivity level and the 
distribution of VA and employment shares for emerging countries. In particular, the higher the 
productivity level of an industry the higher the average level of VA shares and the lower the 
average level of employment shares. This could be as a consequence of sectoral concentration if 
the manufacturing sector of emerging markets is more specialised for both VA and employment. 
Indeed, we will show later on that, although differenced are very small, emerging markets 
display higher sectoral concentration or specialization that developed countries. 
(ii) By level of external financial dependence 
The amplitude of the cycle is larger for emerging markets, independently of the level of 
external financial dependence of the industries (Figure 8). When comparing pre- to post-
recession values, overall, emerging countries face large and persistent output losses, except for 
the group of industries which have medium-high external financial dependence. For the 
developed countries, the only group facing gains in VA levels is the Low to No external 
financial dependence, for which recovery occurs within the three years following the recession. 
The two groups with the highest external financial dependence also face the largest contractions 
from REC-3 to REC+3 (≈2.4). Moreover, industries with high dependence on external finance 
face larger contraction in VA growth in both developed and emerging countries. This result is in 
line with the ones found in Braun and Larrain (2005). 
Figure 9 shows that on average developed countries are lagging the recession episode 
by one year for all groups of financial external dependence, except from the medium-high one. 
This is in contrast to the emerging markets where the largest contractions are in general 
coinciding with the recession‟s year.23 Moreover, the amplitude of the cycle is larger for 
developed countries, except for those industries with high external financial dependence. As for 
VA growth, the industries with Low to No external financial dependence are the only group of 
the developed countries recovering to pre-recession levels after three years. In the emerging 
countries, the opposite pattern is observed. 
                                                          
22 Results per country for each group of productivity level are available upon request. 
23 The Low to No external financial dependence seems to be leading the recession by one year, although only 
marginal difference exists between REC-1 and REC growth rates. 
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Combining the above results, we can see that, although only the medium-low 
dependence group of the developed countries faces permanent gains in productivity levels, 
recovery happens overall quicker in developed than in emerging economies (Figure 10). This 
result is of course confirmed by Figure 11, which shows the evolution of productivity levels. 
Clearly, recovery in the emerging markets is productivity driven in the Low to No external 
financial dependence group of industries, as it faces long-lasting employment losses together 
with productivity gains. For the remaining three groups (medium-low, medium-high, and high 
external financial dependence) recovery is employment driven, as those groups are characterised 
by gains in employment levels together with large and persistent productive losses. On the other 
hand, for the developed countries the pattern is vaguer. The recovery of the Low to No external 
financial dependence group is employment driven, while the one of the medium-low is 
productivity driven. For the two groups with the highest external financial dependence, recovery 
is as much productivity as employment driven, given that both groups face permanent losses in 
employment and productivity levels. 
As for the previous grouping, the average evolution of VA and employment shares per 
level of external financial dependence do not display very marked variations around the 
recession date (Figures 12 and 13, respectively). In general, there seems to be a redistribution 
of shares from the industries that have No or Low external financial dependence towards the 
other three groups with higher dependence. This pattern holds for both the developed and the 
emerging countries, although for the latter only the medium-low category of industries seems to 
be gaining employment shares after a recession episode. As expected, developed countries, 
which are more open to international capital flows, have a larger average of shares in those 
industries that are medium-highly or highly dependent on external finance than the emerging 
markets. The opposite is true for the low dependence groups. Interestingly, as opposed to the 
previous results where industries were grouped in terms of productivity levels, there is no clear 
relationship between the level of industrial external financial dependence and the distribution of 
VA and employment shares for either emerging or developed countries. Therefore, sectoral 
concentration in emerging markets occurs according to industrial productivity levels. 
5.1.2. Normal versus Financial Recessions 
In this part we compare normal and financial recessions. Note that to compare results 
between the previous and the current analysis, one will have to look at the average evolution for 
all countries and all recessions. However, results are likely to present slight differences as 
averages are taken by country and not by the number of recessions or industries within a 
country. In other words, because we assume that countries in our sample are equally important 
we don‟t estimate weighted averages to account for the number of recessions in each industry 
and each category (productivity level or external financial dependence). For instance, because of 
missing data one country might have only 4 industries in each grouping instead of 7, which 
would be the case for a country which has no missing industries. If we were to perform a 
weighted average to account for the number of industries in each grouping, we would be 
assuming that industries in the former country are more “important” than industries in the latter. 
The same would hold for the number of recessions. Based on that, results are deemed to slightly 
differ from one analysis to the other. 
(i) By levels of productivity  
Figure 14 shows the evolution of average VA growth per level of productivity from 
REC-3 to REC+3 for all countries, when normal or financial recessions occur. For any given 
group of productivity level, we can see that contractions always take place at t=REC for both 
normal and financial recessions. However, those are larger for the case of financial recessions. 
Moreover, those type of episodes display a W shaped pattern, as growth at REC+1 is at higher 
levels than pre-recession, but during the following two years growth falls to lower levels. 
Therefore, when comparing REC-3 to REC+3 values, all industries seem to face losses in VA 
levels, except from those that have low productivity levels. This is the only group which 
recovers from financial recessions within three years. For normal recessions, the recovery is 
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even slower as none of the four groups displays post-recession growth higher than pre-recession 
one. Therefore, whatever the productivity level when normal recessions occur, industries face 
losses in VA values. This result is also supported by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) who found 
that during the year of the crises, emerging markets face a sharper fall in real GDP growth but a 
somewhat faster comeback to growth than advanced economies. Similar results are also 
presented by Calderón and Fuentes (2010). Figure 25, which compares financial recessions for 
emerging and developed economies, highlights some major differences between those two 
groups of countries. Firstly, the W shape pattern observed in Figure 13 is mainly driven by the 
developed countries as, independently of the productivity group, industries seem to face major 
contractions two years after the recession. Secondly, most of the industries seem to recover 
financial recessions in emerging economies, while the opposite holds for the advanced 
countries. Finally, emerging markets face larger contractions at t=REC than developed 
countries. 
Employment growth seems to be lagging the financial recessions by one year in the high 
and low productivity industries (Figure 14).
24
 Overall, recovery happens immediately after a 
financial episode and the majority of the industries face large gains in employment levels. On 
the other hand, the recovery for normal recessions is much slower and three years after the 
episode growth has still not reached pre-recession levels. Clearly, whatever the productivity 
level of an industry when normal recessions occur, industries on average face permanent losses 
in employment levels. 
Productivity growth displays the W shaped pattern for financial recessions, with the 
peaks usually happening at REC-1 and REC+1 and the troughs at REC and REC+2 (Figure 15). 
Again, this pattern is driven by the developed countries as we can see from Figure 27. When 
financial recessions occur, recovery is mostly employment driven for three out of four groups, 
namely the high, medium-high and low productivity level groups, as they are characterized by 
long-lasting employment gains together with long-lasting productivity losses. Normal 
recessions display a less volatile productivity growth around the year of the episode and gains in 
productivity level occur, independently of the industries‟ productivity level. For this type of 
recessions, recovery is as much productivity as employment driven as they face losses in both, 
except for the high productivity group for which recovery is clearly productivity driven. 
Figure 17 shows the average VA share for all countries for normal and financial 
recessions. Although shares do not display much variation around the REC point, some 
cyclicality is observable especially for the two highest productive groups of industries. When 
normal recessions occur, there seems to be a redistribution of VA shares from the most 
productive groups to the low productive ones. For financial recession, VA shares are 
redistributed from the low productivity group to the remaining three, with the two middle 
productivity industries facing the biggest gains in VA shares. Figure 29 suggests that emerging 
markets display more cyclicality than developed countries during a financial episode. Moreover, 
while for developed countries the redistribution in VA shares happens from the less productive 
to the most productive industries, the opposite is true for developed markets. Employment 
shares show more pronounced trends than in the case of VA shares (Figure 18). For financial 
recessions, the redistribution of employment shares happens in the same direction as for the VA 
shares. However, in the occurrence of normal recessions, industries in the two lowest productive 
groups lose shares and the ones in the two highest productive groups gain shares, which is the 
opposite pattern to the one displayed by the evolution of VA shares. Figure 30 displays no 
major differences in the redistribution of employment shares for developed and developing 
countries. 
(ii) By levels of external financial dependence 
In this section, we present the evolution of the different variables for normal and 
financial recessions, with industries being ranked by their level of external financial 
                                                          
24 As Figure 26 shows this pattern is driven by the developed countries. 
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dependence. Clearly, the general picture follows very closely the one observed under the 
productivity level classification.
25
 
 Figure 20, displaying the evolution of VA growth, shows that, on average, the 
amplitude of the cycle is larger for financial than for normal recessions. However, the difference 
is much smaller for the industries that have medium-low or Low to No external financial 
dependence than the other two groups (1.5 percentage points for the Low to No external 
financial dependence industries, 0.7 percentage points for the medium-low group, 5.6 and 6.8 
percentage points for the medium-high and high external financial dependence groups, 
respectively). Overall, industries with high external financial dependence face larger 
contractions in VA growth the year of the episodes, with contractions being larger for the case 
of financial recessions. In the case of normal recessions, industries do generally face losses in 
VA levels as post-recession growth is lower than pre-recession one. When financial episodes hit 
an economy, it seems that the medium-high and Low to No external financial dependence 
groups recover within 3 years following the recession. The opposite holds for the two remaining 
groups of industries.  
Employment growth is lagging the financial recession episodes for the medium-low and 
Low to No external financial dependence groups (Figure 21). This type of recessions leads to 
gains in employment levels for all industries, except from the ones that have medium-low 
external financial dependence. For normal recessions, the largest contractions occur the year of 
the episode and in general industries face losses in employment levels. Only the medium-high 
external financial dependence group recovers to pre-recession growth levels (2.5% at REC-3 
versus 3.1% at REC+3). 
From the evolution of productivity growth plotted in Figure 22 we can see that for the 
two lowest groups of external financial dependence industries, contractions at t=REC are larger 
when normal recession occurs, but post-recession growth is higher than pre-recession one. 
Therefore, industries that have medium-low or Low to No external financial dependence also 
face gains in productivity growth. Clearly, the recovery in these groups is mostly productivity 
driven, as they face long-lasting employment losses together with long-lasting productivity 
gains. The remaining two groups, which have higher dependence on external finance, face 
losses in productivity levels. While the recovery in the medium-high category is mostly 
employment driven, the one in the high dependence group is as much productivity as 
employment driven. For the case of financial recessions, recovery is mostly employment driven 
as the majority of the groups face long-lasting employment gains together with long-lasting 
productivity losses. 
Shares do not display much variation around the recession points, especially for the case 
of normal recessions (Figures 24 and 25 for VA and employment shares, respectively). As 
opposed to the previous results when industries were categorised in terms of productivity levels, 
normal recessions lead to a redistribution of VA shares from the 3 groups of industries with the 
lowest external financial dependence to the highly dependent industries. There is no particular 
patter characterising the redistribution of VA shares for the case of financial recessions. The 
exact opposite effects are observed for employment shares. This time, normal recessions do not 
display any particular distributional pattern, while for financial recessions, redistribution occurs 
from the industries that have no or low external financial dependence to the remaining groups 
with higher dependence. 
5.2.  Sectoral concentration/specialisation  
Tables 4 to 7 present the Gini and HHI coefficients for sectoral VA and employment 
shares, respectively. Results are presented for all countries together with the averages for the 
developed and the emerging economies from 3 years before to 3 years after a recession episode. 
                                                          
25 Figure 31 to Figure 36 compare the evolution of all variables and all groups of industries, ranked in terms of the 
level of external financial dependence, during financial episodes for developed and emerging countries. Results are 
very similar to the ones observed when industries were ranked in terms of productivity levels. 
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Overall, it is obvious that changes in sectoral specialisation/concentration are small. Despite 
that, some important patterns can be observed. When looking at the Gini coefficient two main 
conclusions can be drawn:  
1. The manufacturing sector of developed countries is less specialised for both VA and 
Employment, when compared to emerging markets (0.488 versus 0.497 when using sectoral VA 
shares and 0.507 versus 0.517 when using sectoral employment shares as a measure of sector 
size).  
2. For both developed and emerging countries, employment shares are in general more 
unequally distributed than VA shares. Although for emerging markets the gap between those 
two measures is marginally larger the three years before the recession, at t=REC and the three 
years following the recession this gap becomes larger for the developed economies. This implies 
that before the recession, productivity is more concentrated in emerging than in developed 
countries. However, at the recession year and the three years that follow productivity becomes 
more concentrated in developed than in emerging countries. 
Moreover, when looking at the HHI index, results indicate that: 
1. With the exception of a few countries like Singapore, Ecuador and Panama, all countries 
display low concentration (HHI<0.1) whether using sectoral employment or VA shares. 
2. When using either the sectoral VA or employment shares to estimate the HHI, concentration 
is significantly higher among emerging markets than it is among developed countries (0.0502 
versus 0.0385 and 0.0582 versus 0.0410, respectively). 
3. As for the Gini coefficient, employment shares are in general more unequally distributed 
than VA shares. Therefore, productivity is more concentrated in emerging than in developed 
countries, as the gap between the two measures (VA and employment shares) is larger for the 
former group of countries throughout the seven years of analysis. Although the gap is slightly 
higher for emerging markets, after a recession this closes down much more for emerging than 
for developed countries. 
 When looking at the behaviour around recessions of either the Gini coefficient or the 
HHI index we can see that for developed countries both VA and employment shares result in a 
small increase of the concentration around the recession episode. The same is observed for 
emerging markets when using sectoral VA shares to measure concentration. However, when 
using employment shares to estimate the sectoral concentration, the Gini coefficient suggests 
that recessions lead to a minimal decrease in the concentration of sectors. Nevertheless, note 
that magnitude changes are in general relatively small. 
5.3. Shift-Share analysis 
In this section, we present the results obtained from the shift-share analysis. Figure 37 
plots the 3 effects, namely the within-, the between-, and the dynamic-shift effects, together 
with the recession dates shaded in red for all countries considered.  
Overall, as expected, the within-shift effect is positive for the great majority of countries 
considered. This result implies that, on aggregate, reallocations of labour between industries 
(with different productivity levels) do not play an important effect on overall productivity 
growth. This effect appears to be dominating the structural components, which is in line with 
results reported in the literature.
26
 Of course, at this level of aggregation, all structural shifts 
between firms within branches will be included in the within effect. To the extent that little 
resource shift happens between very different branches, we would then expect the between-shift 
effect to be of a smaller magnitude. The other two effects, the between- and dynamic-shift 
effects, are more volatile and can be either positive or negative.  
One pattern that seems to distinguish developed and emerging countries is that the 
dynamic-shift plays a more important role in the latter than in the former. In particular, for 
developed countries while the within- and the between-shift effects seem to be compensating for 
each other‟s movements, the dynamic-shift effect usually moves around the 0% line. On the 
other hand, for emerging markets this effect is much more pronounced and appears to 
                                                          
26 See for instance Fagenberg (2000) and Peneder (2003). 
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compensate for the “jumps” observed in the within- or the between-shift effects. There are of 
course exceptions to these observations with the most striking examples being the case of Israel, 
Finland, Netherlands, Spain and the UK. For those countries there is at least one year during the 
sample period where the dynamic-shift effect becomes a major structural component.  
There does not seem to be a clear pattern between the structural components and the 
recession episodes. Therefore, one could perhaps conclude that sector-level reallocation doesn‟t 
seem to be associated with the state of the business cycle but rather with technological and 
institutional changes. Thus, at this level of disaggregation at least, this contradicts theories 
predicting that during recessions, there will be more restructuring (i.e., Hall (1991), and 
Caballero and Hammour (1994). 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, we characterize the behaviour of economies around recession periods at a 
more disaggregate level by looking at industrial data for a set of 37 developed and emerging 
countries. Industries are categorised in terms of on the one hand, their productivity level and on 
the other, their level of external financial dependence. Based on those groupings, we look at the 
evolution of VA, employment, productivity, industrial concentration and sectoral shares. We 
also distinguish between normal and financial recessions to examine the evolution of those same 
variables when industries are either ranked in terms of productivity levels or in terms of their 
level of external financial dependence. Moreover, we look at the incidence of economy-wide 
versus industry-specific recessions. Using the Gini coefficient and the HHI index, we measure 
concentration of VA and employment shares around the recession episodes. Finally, we identify 
the sources of productivity growth using shift-share analysis.  Although it is not possible to 
extract meaningful causal or structural interpretations from our results, they provide a set of 
stylized facts that are useful for both policy and model building. 
Fact 1: Recessions tend to have only slightly higher incidence and duration in emerging 
markets when compared with developed ones. However, the amplitude of these events is much 
larger leading, in general, to much deeper output losses. This confirms previous aggregate 
evidence (i.e., Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007, Loayaza et al., 2007, and Calderon and Fuentes, 
2010). 
Fact 2: Recessions tend to be more industry specific events in emerging markets and economy-
wide phenomena in developed countries. 
Fact 3: While emerging markets display more dispersion in VA growth rates and hence more 
industry-specific recessions, this dispersion behaves counter-cyclically for developed countries 
and pro-cyclically for emerging markets. 
Fact 4: Whether industries are grouped in terms of their productivity level or their level of 
external financial dependence, the amplitude of the cycle for VA and productivity growth is 
larger for emerging markets. The opposite is generally true for employment growth. The lower 
variability in employment in emerging economies suggests a higher degree of real wage 
flexibility in these countries.  
Fact 5: In developed countries, the two highly productive groups of industries display the 
slowest comeback in VA growth after a recession, while in the emerging economies it is the two 
lowest productive groups that seem to be affected the most. 
Fact 6: Overall, recovery in developed countries is mostly productivity driven, independently of 
the level of industrial productivity, while for emerging markets recovery is mostly employment 
driven.  
Fact 7: In developed countries there seems to be a redistribution of VA and employment shares 
from the lowest productivity group to the rest of the industries. This only holds for employment 
shares in the emerging countries.  
Fact 8: Industries with high dependence on external finance generally face higher contractions 
in VA growth the year of the recession, and those contractions are higher on the one hand, for 
the emerging countries when compared to developed economies, and on the other hand, in the 
case of financial than in the case of normal recessions.  
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Fact 9: After a recession episode, VA shares are redistributed from the industries that have Low 
or No external financial dependence towards the other groups with higher dependence. This 
pattern holds for both the developed and the emerging countries. For employment shares the 
same pattern is observed but only for the developed economies. 
Fact 10: When financial recessions occur, industries face larger contractions in VA growth, 
independently of whether industries are grouped in terms of productivity level or external 
financial dependence.  
Fact 11: While in the occurrence of normal recessions there seems to be a redistribution of VA 
shares from the most productive to the less productive groups, in the case of financial episodes 
the opposite is observed. However, employment shares are generally redistributed from the less 
productive group(s) to the most productive ones for both normal and financial recessions. 
Fact 12: Concentration of both VA and employment is higher among emerging markets, and 
especially when looking at employment shares. Overall, productivity is more concentrated in 
emerging than in developed countries. However, the Gini coefficient suggests that at the 
recession and the three following years, productivity becomes more concentrated in developed 
than in emerging countries. 
Fact 13: Changes in industrial concentration around recessions are small for both groups of 
countries, but in general they lead to slightly higher concentration. 
Fact 14: Productivity growth is mostly driven by within-branch productivity gains, confirming 
previous aggregate evidence (i.e., Fagenberg, 2000 and Peneder, 2003). For emerging markets, 
there is a non-negligible dynamic-shift effect too. However, the relation between recessions and 
productivity decomposition is not clear cut. One could conclude with caution that at this level of 
disaggregation, sector-level reallocation doesn‟t seem to be associated with the state of the 
business cycle but rather with technological and institutional changes.  
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Table 1: List of countries and descriptive analysis of recessions 
Country 
Sample 
Period 
Sum Drop of 
Output 
Mean Drop of 
Output 
Nb. of 
REC 
Aver. Duration 
of REC 
Nb. of Deep 
Recessions 
Australia 1970-2001 -3.012 -1.506 2 1.000 0 
Austria 1970-2002 -0.669 -0.167 4 1.000 0 
Belgium 1970-2001 -2.568 -0.856 3 1.000 0 
Canada 1970-2002 -4.953 -2.477 2 1.000 1 
Chile 1970-1998 -31.233 -6.247 5 1.667 4 
Colombia 1970-1999 -4.204 -4.204 1 1.000 1 
Denmark 1970-1991 -3.432 -0.686 5 1.667 0 
Ecuador 1970-2002 -11.546 -2.887 4 1.500 1 
Finland 1970-2002 -10.899 -3.633 3 3.000 2 
France 1970-2002 -1.886 -0.943 2 1.000 0 
Germany 1970-1991 -1.834 -0.917 2 1.000 0 
Greece 1970-1998 -14.062 -2.344 6 1.500 1 
Honk Kong 1973-2002 -6.026 -6.026 1 1.000 1 
Hungary 1970-2002 -19.347 -3.225 6 2.000 3 
India 1970-2002 -5.787 -2.894 2 1.000 1 
Indonesia 1970-2002 -13.127 -13.127 1 1.000 1 
Iran 1970-2002 -54.708 -4.973 11 2.500 6 
Ireland 1970-2001 -0.672 -0.336 2 1.000 0 
Israel 1970-2002 -1.574 -0.525 3 1.000 0 
Italy 1970-2002 -2.979 -1.490 2 1.000 0 
Japan 1970-2002 -3.416 -1.139 3 1.500 0 
Jordan 1979-2002 -15.304 -7.652 2 2.000 1 
Korea 1970-2001 -8.342 -4.171 2 1.000 1 
Malaysia 1970-2002 -8.481 -4.241 2 1.000 1 
Malta 1975-2000 -0.612 -0.612 1 1.000 0 
Netherlands 1970-1993 -1.797 -0.899 2 2.000 0 
New Zealand 1970-1987 -7.775 -1.555 5 2.000 1 
Norway 1970-2001 -0.173 -0.173 1 1.000 0 
Panama 1970-2000 -19.680 -6.560 3 1.500 2 
Portugal 1970-2002 -8.443 -2.111 4 1.333 1 
Singapore 1970-2002 -5.219 -1.740 3 1.000 0 
Spain 1970-2002 -1.165 -0.583 2 1.000 0 
Sweden 1970-2000 -6.046 -1.209 5 1.667 0 
Turkey 1970-1997 -7.739 -2.580 3 1.500 1 
UK 1970-2002 -6.910 -1.382 5 1.667 0 
US 1970-2002 -3.058 -0.612 5 1.250 0 
Zimbabwe 1970-1995 -22.422 -4.484 5 1.250 2 
ALL  -8.590 -2.734 120 1.365 32 
Developed  -4.207 -1.240 71 1.345 6 (All) / 29 (DV) 
Emerging  -15.237 -4.925 49 1.394 26 (All) / 20 (EM) 
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Table 2: Industry-specific and economy-wide recessions 
 
Countries 
% of industries in 
recession at 
t=REC 
% of recessions leading X% of industries to be in recession 
0 - 
30% 
30 - 
40% 
40 - 
50% 
50 - 
60% 
60 - 
70% 
70 - 100% 
Australia 78.571     50.000 50.000 
Austria 57.143  25.000 25.000  25.000 25.000 
Belgium 73.333    33.333  66.667 
Canada 88.889      100.000 
Denmark 60.714  20.000   60.000 20.000 
Finland 62.821   33.333 33.333  33.333 
France 58.000   50.000  50.000  
West Germany 81.481      100.000 
Greece 61.905   33.333  50.000 16.667 
Ireland 35.185 50.000  50.000    
Israel 56.667 33.333     66.667 
Italy 75.000      100.000 
Japan 77.778    33.333  66.667 
Netherlands 63.043    50.000 50.000  
New Zealand 50.000 25.000   25.000 50.000  
Norway 75.000      100.000 
Portugal 57.407   25.000 25.000 25.000 25.000 
Singapore 75.362     33.333 66.667 
Spain 75.926    50.000  50.000 
Sweden 71.429 20.000     80.000 
UK 72.857    20.000 20.000 60.000 
US 75.000    20.000  80.000 
Total Dv 67.432 5.714 2.857 10.000 12.857 21.429 47.143 
Chile 57.857 20.000 20.000  20.000  40.000 
Colombia 85.714      100.000 
Ecuador 65.385 25.000     75.000 
Honk Kong 84.615      100.000 
Hungary 59.615 16.667 16.667   16.667 50.000 
India 44.643 50.000    50.000  
Indonesia 86.364      100.000 
Iran 51.818 36.364 9.091 9.091 9.091  36.364 
Jordan 46.875  50.000   50.000  
Korea 75.926     50.000 50.000 
Malaysia 69.231     50.000 50.000 
Malta 41.667   100.000    
Panama 61.111   66.667   33.333 
Turkey 63.095  33.333   33.333 33.333 
Zimbabwe 65.833   20.000 20.000 20.000 40.000 
Total Em 63.983 16.327 10.204 10.204 6.122 14.286 42.857 
Total Dv&Em 65.708 10.084 5.882 10.084 10.084 18.487 45.378 
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Table 3: Standard Deviation of VA growth across industries 
Countries REC-3 REC-2 REC-1 REC REC+1 REC+2 REC+3 
Australia 6.264 4.864 6.524 7.883 13.347 14.824 7.453 
Austria 16.334 12.878 12.612 30.415 13.966 35.136 30.385 
Belgium 12.233 16.183 25.146 16.619 10.459 13.424 10.125 
Canada 15.812 8.873 9.017 8.853 8.978 9.533 20.513 
Chile 24.203 30.651 26.318 34.293 38.020 21.524 23.328 
Colombia 15.386 13.690 13.299 16.072    
Denmark 8.131 8.619 13.517 13.272 11.959 10.158 10.018 
Ecuador 16.958 21.766 19.651 30.866 37.432 31.835 72.742 
Finland 15.425 14.323 11.834 12.624 12.371 13.530 13.949 
France 8.789 11.301 11.148 14.664 6.929 6.983 10.793 
West Germany 10.977 9.756 18.718 8.508 7.797 11.882 8.464 
Greece 11.909 14.713 20.910 14.648 15.301 12.872 14.321 
Honk Kong 31.115 14.900 26.255 11.769 15.653 19.582 15.887 
Hungary 14.991 16.149 16.685 17.883 90.128 100.481 102.054 
India 23.047 12.379 16.731 18.238 18.493 27.172 13.718 
Indonesia 14.200 15.055 25.710 25.213 33.843 35.903 30.012 
Iran 22.953 19.776 19.677 20.407 19.296 19.465 22.025 
Ireland 13.041 11.053 10.592 19.275 12.863 10.116 19.159 
Israel 10.251 7.960 8.588 9.217 17.094 10.339 7.018 
Italy 10.527 11.682 11.037 7.824 13.614 9.748 7.813 
Japan 6.040 6.828 8.624 9.166 8.948 10.238 11.718 
Jordan 43.197 37.799 33.967 36.952 29.196 22.294 29.247 
Korea 17.386 15.175 14.196 16.626 15.591 11.146 10.570 
Malaysia 12.902 25.304 18.923 16.334 31.661 20.326 19.125 
Malta 32.835 20.106 18.586 16.285 20.058 15.684 19.970 
Netherlands 10.704 7.778 20.170 20.118 9.872 10.693 11.801 
New Zealand 25.226 10.873 11.728 8.840 10.640 8.110 9.331 
Norway 11.647 18.993 20.760 26.451 10.481 12.332 10.504 
Panama 66.774 39.170 28.475 25.678 26.612 36.760 39.027 
Portugal 18.556 15.415 19.110 18.141 15.646 24.376 29.217 
Singapore 14.356 10.991 15.632 16.760 18.616 15.440 13.076 
Spain 25.101 10.679 13.283 11.370 10.829 8.390 9.174 
Sweden 11.258 11.260 15.109 11.747 13.438 12.060 9.972 
Turkey 20.027 19.781 19.160 16.422 30.648 30.790 19.555 
UK 9.577 8.170 7.606 8.972 9.563 7.111 8.910 
US 6.845 6.524 6.322 7.969 6.156 7.542 6.017 
Zimbabwe 10.841 9.977 12.022 14.169 12.225 14.984 16.041 
Av. Dv & Em 17.455 14.903 16.423 16.771 18.826 18.966 19.806 
Av. Dv 12.682 10.896 13.545 13.788 11.767 12.493 12.715 
Av. Em 24.454 20.779 20.644 21.147 27.924 27.196 28.887 
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Table 4: Gini Coefficient using sectoral employment shares 
Countries REC-3 REC-2 REC-1 REC REC+1 REC+2 REC+3 
Australia 0.50382 0.50667 0.50488 0.50425 0.50173 0.50786 0.51206 
Austria 0.47391 0.47282 0.46994 0.47288 0.47188 0.46864 0.47148 
Belgium 0.50541 0.50819 0.50727 0.48678 0.46537 0.44896 0.44738 
Canada 0.44626 0.44940 0.44858 0.44872 0.45053 0.45110 0.45718 
Denmark 0.51490 0.51645 0.51947 0.52346 0.52475 0.53259 0.53567 
Finland 0.51073 0.51490 0.51756 0.51900 0.52050 0.52049 0.52107 
France 0.44110 0.44416 0.44656 0.44944 0.44976 0.45039 0.44690 
West Germany 0.50013 0.50072 0.50577 0.50980 0.51296 0.51483 0.51854 
Greece 0.50384 0.50601 0.50719 0.50182 0.50053 0.50278 0.50142 
Ireland 0.48975 0.49445 0.49971 0.50133 0.50800 0.51485 0.51285 
Israel 0.45364 0.46061 0.46354 0.46857 0.47863 0.50242 0.50604 
Italy 0.46835 0.46814 0.46524 0.46694 0.46555 0.46626 0.46816 
Japan 0.52240 0.52362 0.52755 0.52788 0.52909 0.53171 0.53229 
Netherlands 0.50999 0.51250 0.50217 0.49253 0.49602 0.49970 0.50996 
New Zealand 0.54326 0.54461 0.54514 0.54566 0.54962 0.55060 0.55100 
Norway 0.56466 0.56309 0.56446 0.56491 0.57509 0.57868 0.58009 
Portugal 0.51534 0.51629 0.51583 0.51312 0.51259 0.51173 0.51653 
Singapore 0.62451 0.63084 0.63147 0.63028 0.62969 0.63689 0.64785 
Spain 0.43851 0.44122 0.44375 0.43671 0.44036 0.44363 0.44276 
Sweden 0.57463 0.57758 0.57943 0.58281 0.58422 0.58550 0.58759 
UK 0.49722 0.49748 0.50046 0.50229 0.50283 0.49771 0.49982 
US 0.48443 0.48771 0.49062 0.49154 0.49071 0.49268 0.49538 
Av. Gini DV 0.50395 0.50625 0.50712 0.50640 0.50729 0.50955 0.51191 
Chile 0.50243 0.49154 0.50281 0.50539 0.50739 0.51548 0.51528 
Colombia 0.51504 0.51943 0.52280 0.54017    
Ecuador 0.44211 0.43796 0.44340 0.44198 0.43495 0.43367 0.43789 
Honk Kong 0.50266 0.48701 0.47425 0.46330 0.46122 0.46541 0.48242 
Hungary 0.46785 0.46342 0.46075 0.45837 0.45718 0.45988 0.45959 
India 0.64926 0.64318 0.63930 0.63830 0.64247 0.64371 0.64060 
Indonesia 0.48020 0.47682 0.46539 0.46226 0.48015 0.48208 0.45064 
Iran 0.57697 0.57132 0.56549 0.56008 0.55618 0.55683 0.55687 
Jordan 0.43109 0.43047 0.42031 0.42837 0.44232 0.44580 0.44841 
Korea 0.51313 0.50966 0.51259 0.50836 0.51335 0.51243 0.51535 
Malaysia 0.55120 0.55656 0.55221 0.54922 0.56183 0.54146 0.54049 
Malta 0.53020 0.52275 0.51681 0.52268 0.51925 0.52856 0.51113 
Panama 0.60192 0.60123 0.61167 0.61613 0.62310 0.63075 0.63892 
Turkey 0.55676 0.55657 0.55647 0.55902 0.55818 0.55386 0.55282 
Zimbabwe 0.47755 0.47424 0.47965 0.49730 0.48034 0.48005 0.47767 
Av. Gini EM 0.51989 0.51614 0.51493 0.51673 0.51699 0.51786 0.51629 
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Table 5: Gini Coefficient using sectoral VA shares 
Countries REC-3 REC-2 REC-1 REC REC+1 REC+2 REC+3 
Australia 0.46232 0.46608 0.47363 0.47741 0.50087 0.50044 0.49596 
Austria 0.42426 0.43057 0.42799 0.42255 0.43637 0.42690 0.42094 
Belgium 0.44847 0.44834 0.44677 0.44506 0.43842 0.45121 0.46367 
Canada 0.46829 0.47134 0.47062 0.46905 0.46550 0.46408 0.46098 
Denmark 0.51691 0.51369 0.52061 0.53786 0.53785 0.53571 0.53082 
Finland 0.51541 0.50756 0.51185 0.51902 0.53214 0.55240 0.56160 
France 0.42668 0.42796 0.41477 0.41945 0.42514 0.43079 0.43614 
West Germany 0.46115 0.46587 0.48053 0.48467 0.48536 0.48847 0.49119 
Greece 0.47939 0.48178 0.49568 0.49623 0.49957 0.49950 0.49625 
Ireland 0.54449 0.55579 0.56902 0.58267 0.60322 0.61904 0.62913 
Israel 0.42574 0.42432 0.43156 0.44240 0.44912 0.43175 0.43002 
Italy 0.42198 0.41726 0.41873 0.42215 0.42460 0.43043 0.42740 
Japan 0.50108 0.50612 0.50923 0.51880 0.52828 0.53203 0.53179 
Netherlands 0.49709 0.50167 0.50031 0.49600 0.49950 0.49962 0.49230 
New Zealand 0.44491 0.44383 0.44352 0.45237 0.45386 0.45710 0.46146 
Norway 0.50879 0.51257 0.51507 0.49858 0.50149 0.48736 0.48063 
Portugal 0.44174 0.43972 0.43958 0.43359 0.43077 0.43070 0.41555 
Singapore 0.67558 0.69091 0.71029 0.69571 0.69495 0.68751 0.68796 
Spain 0.43273 0.42293 0.43012 0.43455 0.42502 0.42371 0.42391 
Sweden 0.56974 0.56819 0.56442 0.56881 0.57008 0.57396 0.57667 
UK 0.43677 0.43732 0.44367 0.44982 0.45192 0.45237 0.44827 
US 0.46228 0.46690 0.46640 0.47285 0.47085 0.47525 0.47652 
Av. Gini DV 0.48026 0.48185 0.48565 0.48816 0.49204 0.49320 0.49269 
Chile 0.53426 0.51514 0.52638 0.55159 0.54869 0.55504 0.56115 
Colombia 0.55224 0.53203 0.54842 0.56783    
Ecuador 0.54217 0.54290 0.51760 0.54374 0.55225 0.53288 0.53859 
Honk Kong 0.42448 0.40425 0.39587 0.40138 0.44422 0.44699 0.43767 
Hungary 0.43280 0.43488 0.43814 0.44147 0.45148 0.45869 0.46842 
India 0.51819 0.51826 0.53066 0.53416 0.54651 0.53772 0.52826 
Indonesia 0.44330 0.43947 0.47211 0.46034 0.42988 0.43930 0.41678 
Iran 0.51771 0.51501 0.51546 0.51539 0.51732 0.51902 0.51646 
Jordan 0.36952 0.37858 0.38535 0.39382 0.39437 0.39353 0.40690 
Korea 0.44051 0.44717 0.45737 0.47424 0.49680 0.49973 0.49648 
Malaysia 0.48627 0.50065 0.51955 0.52405 0.54065 0.55190 0.53421 
Malta 0.52396 0.50074 0.52056 0.52103 0.52207 0.54433 0.53778 
Panama 0.60482 0.59246 0.59817 0.62167 0.63404 0.62347 0.61795 
Turkey 0.47058 0.46091 0.46999 0.47698 0.48733 0.49863 0.49406 
Zimbabwe 0.46824 0.47652 0.48869 0.49776 0.49773 0.49708 0.48729 
Av. Gini EM 0.48860 0.48393 0.49229 0.50170 0.50452 0.50702 0.50300 
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Table 6: HHI index using sectoral employment shares 
Countries REC-3 REC-2 REC-1 REC REC+1 REC+2 REC+3 
Australia 0.03231 0.03265 0.03245 0.03319 0.03360 0.04534 0.04573 
Austria 0.02621 0.02610 0.02568 0.02608 0.02602 0.02573 0.02620 
Belgium 0.08023 0.08062 0.08065 0.06097 0.04731 0.03970 0.03930 
Canada 0.02287 0.02315 0.02299 0.02324 0.02388 0.02391 0.02467 
Denmark 0.03789 0.03833 0.03941 0.04076 0.04099 0.04295 0.04384 
Finland 0.03369 0.03455 0.03536 0.03579 0.03610 0.03677 0.03758 
France 0.02696 0.02751 0.02795 0.02851 0.02874 0.02895 0.02857 
West Germany 0.03701 0.03739 0.03878 0.03963 0.04062 0.04075 0.04183 
Greece 0.04105 0.04105 0.04127 0.04074 0.04057 0.04076 0.04013 
Ireland 0.04319 0.04374 0.04362 0.04384 0.04472 0.04463 0.04318 
Israel 0.03269 0.03400 0.03476 0.03613 0.03858 0.04439 0.04567 
Italy 0.02827 0.02818 0.02678 0.02714 0.02688 0.02687 0.02737 
Japan 0.03754 0.03793 0.03881 0.03909 0.03943 0.04007 0.04040 
Netherlands 0.03926 0.03997 0.03780 0.03572 0.03675 0.03779 0.03985 
New Zealand 0.05598 0.05685 0.05826 0.05835 0.06145 0.06200 0.06260 
Norway 0.04312 0.04282 0.04339 0.04365 0.04627 0.04692 0.04834 
Portugal 0.04789 0.04767 0.04682 0.04590 0.04569 0.04541 0.04672 
Singapore 0.09061 0.09463 0.09667 0.09428 0.09547 0.11103 0.12269 
Spain 0.02379 0.02439 0.02496 0.02376 0.02478 0.02527 0.02506 
Sweden 0.04432 0.04491 0.04506 0.04560 0.04578 0.04578 0.04602 
UK 0.03189 0.03197 0.03265 0.03317 0.03316 0.03201 0.03236 
US 0.02811 0.02876 0.02935 0.02941 0.02916 0.02947 0.02994 
Av. HHI DV 0.04022 0.04078 0.04107 0.04022 0.04027 0.04166 0.04264 
Chile 0.03952 0.03729 0.03988 0.04136 0.04356 0.04800 0.04828 
Colombia 0.04255 0.04404 0.04579 0.05023    
Ecuador 0.06078 0.05993 0.06545 0.06578 0.06079 0.06062 0.06520 
Honk Kong 0.06233 0.05489 0.04977 0.04716 0.04562 0.04695 0.05305 
Hungary 0.03164 0.03200 0.03315 0.03363 0.03413 0.03518 0.03518 
India 0.09127 0.08897 0.08636 0.08474 0.08453 0.08515 0.08421 
Indonesia 0.03665 0.03706 0.03543 0.03494 0.03730 0.03783 0.03315 
Iran 0.08054 0.07648 0.07313 0.07156 0.07029 0.06967 0.06924 
Jordan 0.04274 0.04328 0.04015 0.04239 0.04577 0.04659 0.04600 
Korea 0.04288 0.04179 0.04121 0.04084 0.04161 0.04119 0.04024 
Malaysia 0.06181 0.06750 0.06409 0.06565 0.07163 0.05788 0.05462 
Malta 0.08391 0.08107 0.07019 0.07731 0.07585 0.07904 0.07056 
Panama 0.10911 0.10586 0.11157 0.11689 0.13196 0.13369 0.12684 
Turkey 0.05484 0.05395 0.05376 0.05519 0.05597 0.05616 0.05701 
Zimbabwe 0.03392 0.03374 0.03532 0.04356 0.03611 0.03557 0.03541 
Av. HHI EM 0.05830 0.05719 0.05635 0.05808 0.05965 0.05954 0.05850 
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Table 7: HHI index using sectoral VA shares 
Countries REC-3 REC-2 REC-1 REC REC+1 REC+2 REC+3 
Australia 0.02645 0.02686 0.02819 0.02994 0.04865 0.04680 0.04539 
Austria 0.02022 0.02085 0.02040 0.02002 0.02174 0.02054 0.01992 
Belgium 0.04208 0.04138 0.04147 0.04231 0.03879 0.04273 0.04490 
Canada 0.03162 0.03160 0.03144 0.03107 0.03032 0.02968 0.02856 
Denmark 0.03880 0.03811 0.04030 0.04477 0.04476 0.04419 0.04374 
Finland 0.04458 0.04192 0.04221 0.04386 0.04816 0.05363 0.05430 
France 0.02609 0.02630 0.02360 0.02474 0.02720 0.02789 0.02782 
West Germany 0.02979 0.03175 0.03398 0.03491 0.03475 0.03396 0.03613 
Greece 0.03243 0.03352 0.03564 0.03663 0.03731 0.03839 0.03708 
Ireland 0.05067 0.05180 0.05546 0.05865 0.06466 0.06833 0.07057 
Israel 0.03533 0.03553 0.03760 0.04062 0.03925 0.02707 0.02665 
Italy 0.02157 0.02067 0.02126 0.02183 0.02229 0.02361 0.02358 
Japan 0.03334 0.03446 0.03512 0.03665 0.03964 0.03995 0.03921 
Netherlands 0.03689 0.03866 0.03851 0.03754 0.03818 0.03744 0.03566 
New Zealand 0.03165 0.03194 0.03339 0.03661 0.03758 0.03826 0.04034 
Norway 0.03109 0.03175 0.03254 0.02845 0.02845 0.02665 0.02569 
Portugal 0.02558 0.02436 0.02325 0.02217 0.02293 0.02355 0.02099 
Singapore 0.12835 0.14189 0.15014 0.12802 0.12222 0.12781 0.12215 
Spain 0.02355 0.02206 0.02395 0.02429 0.02261 0.02203 0.02226 
Sweden 0.04454 0.04443 0.04365 0.04421 0.04337 0.04338 0.04365 
UK 0.02458 0.02467 0.02546 0.02575 0.02543 0.02557 0.02483 
US 0.02882 0.02957 0.02881 0.02922 0.02862 0.02911 0.02948 
Av. HHI DV 0.03673 0.03746 0.03847 0.03829 0.03941 0.03957 0.03922 
Chile 0.04349 0.03971 0.04364 0.05060 0.04884 0.05201 0.05381 
Colombia 0.04968 0.04433 0.04744 0.05398    
Ecuador 0.10049 0.10050 0.08091 0.10252 0.11957 0.10366 0.10318 
Honk Kong 0.03783 0.03307 0.03220 0.03345 0.04273 0.04375 0.04290 
Hungary 0.02265 0.02400 0.02802 0.03026 0.03346 0.03452 0.03424 
India 0.03538 0.03707 0.03963 0.04393 0.04816 0.04270 0.03840 
Indonesia 0.02731 0.02623 0.03437 0.03058 0.02474 0.02537 0.02344 
Iran 0.04863 0.04671 0.04682 0.04700 0.04830 0.04932 0.04820 
Jordan 0.02302 0.02459 0.02652 0.02961 0.02996 0.02873 0.03156 
Korea 0.03033 0.03148 0.03278 0.04108 0.04467 0.04415 0.04701 
Malaysia 0.05278 0.06113 0.07127 0.07668 0.08590 0.09531 0.07439 
Malta 0.07348 0.05285 0.05443 0.05122 0.05334 0.05824 0.05225 
Panama 0.10539 0.09673 0.09437 0.11332 0.12817 0.11871 0.11063 
Turkey 0.02727 0.02673 0.02789 0.02878 0.03096 0.03171 0.03001 
Zimbabwe 0.03026 0.03235 0.03492 0.03697 0.03723 0.03722 0.03501 
Av. HHI EM 0.04720 0.04517 0.04635 0.05133 0.05543 0.05467 0.05179 
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Figure 1: Standard Deviation of VA growth across industries 
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Figure 1: Average VA Growth per level of productivity for Developed and 
Emerging Countries 
 
 
Figure 2: Average Employment Growth per level of productivity for Developed 
and Emerging Countries 
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Figure 3: Average Productivity Growth per level of productivity for Developed 
and Emerging Countries 
 
 
Figure 4: Average Productivity Level per level of productivity for Developed and 
Emerging Countries 
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Figure 5: Average VA Share per level of productivity for Developed and Emerging 
Countries 
 
 
Figure 6: Average Employment Share per level of productivity for Developed and 
Emerging Countries 
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Figure 7: Average VA growth per level of external financial dependence for 
Developed and Emerging Countries 
 
 
Figure 8: Average Employment growth per level of external financial dependence 
for Developed and Emerging Countries 
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Figure 9: Average Productivity growth per level of external financial dependence 
for Developed and Emerging Countries 
 
 
Figure 10: Average Productivity Level per level of external financial 
dependence for Developed and Emerging Countries 
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Figure 11: Average VA Share per level of external financial dependence for 
Developed and Emerging Countries 
 
 
Figure 12: Average Employment Share per level of external financial dependence 
for Developed and Emerging Countries 
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Figure 13: Average VA growth per level of productivity, Normal versus Financial 
Recessions 
 
 
Figure 14: Average Employment growth per level of productivity, Normal versus 
Financial Recessions 
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Figure 15: Average Productivity growth per level of productivity, Normal versus 
Financial Recessions 
 
 
Figure 16: Average Productivity level per level of productivity, Normal versus 
Financial Recessions 
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Figure 17: Average VA share per level of productivity, Normal versus Financial 
Recessions 
 
 
Figure 18: Average Employment share per level of productivity, Normal versus 
Financial Recessions 
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Figure 19: Average VA growth per level of external financial dependence, Normal 
versus Financial Recessions 
 
 
Figure 20: Average Employment growth per level of external financial 
dependence, Normal versus Financial Recessions 
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Figure 21: Average Productivity growth per level of external financial dependence, 
Normal versus Financial Recessions 
 
 
Figure 22: Average Productivity level per level of external financial dependence, 
Normal versus Financial Recessions 
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Figure 23: Average VA share per level of external financial dependence, Normal 
versus Financial Recessions 
 
 
Figure 24: Average Employment share per level of external financial dependence, 
Normal versus Financial Recessions 
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Figure 25: Financial Recessions, average VA growth per level of productivity for 
Developed and Emerging Countries 
 
 
Figure 26: Financial Recessions, average Employment growth per level of 
productivity for Developed and Emerging Countries 
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Figure 27: Financial Recessions, average Productivity growth per level of 
productivity for Developed and Emerging Countries 
 
 
Figure 28: Financial Recessions, average Productivity level per level of 
productivity for Developed and Emerging Countries 
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Figure 29: Financial Recessions, average VA share per level of productivity for 
Developed and Emerging Countries 
 
 
Figure 30: Financial Recessions, average Employment share per level of 
productivity for Developed and Emerging Countries 
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Figure 31: Financial Recessions, average VA growth per level of external financial 
dependence for Developed and Emerging Countries 
 
 
Figure 32: Financial Recessions, average Employment growth per level of external 
financial dependence for Developed and Emerging Countries 
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Figure 33: Financial Recessions, average Productivity growth per level of external 
financial dependence for Developed and Emerging Countries 
 
 
Figure 34: Financial Recessions, average Productivity level per level of external 
financial dependence for Developed and Emerging Countries 
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Figure 35: Financial Recessions, average VA share per level of external financial 
dependence for Developed and Emerging Countries 
 
 
Figure 36: Financial Recessions, average Employment share per level of external 
financial dependence for Developed and Emerging Countries 
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Figure 37: Decomposition of labour productivity growth for all countries 
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Appendix A: List of industries 
ISIC INDUSTRIES 
311 Food products 
313 Beverages 
314 Tobacco 
321 Textiles 
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 
323 Leather products 
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 
331 Wood products, except furniture 
332 Furniture, except metal 
341 Paper and products 
342 Printing and publishing 
351 Industrial chemicals 
352 Other chemicals 
353 Petroleum refineries 
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products 
355 Rubber products 
356 Plastic products 
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 
362 Glass and products 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 
371 Iron and steel 
372 Non-ferrous metals 
381 Fabricated metal products 
382 Machinery, except electrical 
383 Machinery, electric 
384 Transport equipment 
385 Professional & scientific equipment 
390 Other manufactured products 
 
Appendix B: Externally identified financial recessions 
Country Year of Financial Recession 
Australia 1991 
Denmark 1988 
Ecuador 1999 
Finland 1991-93 
Greece 1993 
Honk-Kong 1998 
Hungary 1991-93 
Indonesia 1998 
Israel 1977 
Italy 1993 
Jordan 1989 
Malaysia 1985 
Norway 1988 
Panama 1988 
Spain 1981 
Sweden 1991-93 
Turkey 1994 
UK 1974-75, 1991 
US 1991 
 
